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Abstract 
Pluralism about scientific method is more-or-less accepted, but the consequences have yet 
to be drawn out. Scientists adopt different methods in response to different epistemic 
situations: depending on the system they are interested in, the resources at their disposal, and 
so forth. If it is right that different methods are appropriate in different situations, then 
mismatches between methods and situations are possible. This is most likely to occur due to 
method bias: when we prefer a particular kind of method, despite that method clashing with 
evidential context or our aims. To explore these ideas, we sketch a kind of method pluralism 
which turns on two properties of evidence, before using agent-based models to examine the 
relationship between methods, epistemic situations, and bias. Based on our results, we suggest 
that although method bias can undermine the efficiency of a scientific community, it can also be 
productive through preserving a diversity of evidence. We consider circumstances where 
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method bias could be particularly egregious, and those where it is a potential virtue, and argue 
that consideration of method bias reveals that community standards deserve a central place in 
the epistemology of science. 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have long agreed that there is no single 
scientific method. How to best generate knowledge depends crucially on the kind of knowledge 
in question, as well as technological, social and theoretical context, and the kind of system the 
investigation targets: what we’ll call the ‘epistemic situation1’. Accepting that good knowledge-
production admits of a plurality of methods, and that these are more-or-less appropriate in 
different epistemic situations, leads us to the possibility of method mismatch. The adopted 
method might be inappropriate for the epistemic task. Method mismatch likely occurs due to 
method bias: tacit or explicit ideas about knowledge production might influence scientific 
practice. Our target then, is how opinions about good method in a scientific community—as 
reflected in publishing practices, for instance—might influence the nature and productivity of 
that community.  
In this paper, we articulate a form of method plurality, allowing us to explore both mismatch 
and bias vis-à-vis method. We’ll understand method plurality by distinguishing between two 
properties of evidence. First, what we’ll call sharpness: how incisive evidence is regarding a 
hypothesis. Second, what we’ll call independence: the amount of overlap between the 
background theory which underwrites different evidence. In light of this, we’ll characterize two 
scientific strategies, one targeting sharpness—methodological ‘obligates’—the other 
independence: methodological ‘omnivores’. We’ll then consider under what conditions method 
                                                             
1 For fuller discussion of this notion, see Leonelli 2016, Currie 2018. 
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mismatch could occur, exploring two aspects of epistemic situations. First, the evidential 
context investigators face; second, community-level preferences for different evidence types.  
We’ll not claim that method bias is necessarily problematic: indeed, as we’ll show, 
sometimes introducing it can ensure a diversity of strategies are employed. Moreover, given 
that method bias is, in effect, a community’s preference for types of evidence, it is often 
unavoidable. The take-home message is that the make-up of a scientific community depends 
both upon evidential context, and what is recognised as ‘good evidence’ or practice in that 
community. Publishing standards, funding decisions, the opinions of referees, and so forth, 
affect what kind of work gets done. Recognising that, on the one hand, different investigative 
strategies are more appropriate in different contexts, while on the other hand, opinions about 
what good science looks like might either follow or work against those contexts, allows us to see 
the kinds of effects method bias might have. Moreover, this itself underwrites an argument that 
understanding scientific evidence without taking the relevant community’s views about good 
evidence, and the epistemic situation, into account, is wrong-headed. Indeed: we’ll argue that 
consideration of such community properties is required for understanding evidence. 
In addition to these points about the social epistemology of science, we also take ourselves 
to be making a contribution to discussion of how we should understand and make optimal 
epistemic progress, under constraint, in a Bayesian framework. This more technical discussion 
largely plays out in the footnotes, specifically footnotes 8, 12, 18, 20 and 212. 
We’ll analyse and explore method plurality, mismatch, and bias, via agent-based modelling, 
which we introduce and utilize in sections 3 through 5. We construct an epistemic landscape 
which represents the two properties of evidence which interest us. We then add agents which 
adopt the strategies we’ve mentioned, and publishing standards which reflect the community’s 
method bias. We’ll establish a link between properties of the landscape and the success of 
                                                             
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this angle, and for helpful suggestions on how to 
make it explicit. 
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different strategies. Some landscapes favour obligates, others omnivores. We’ll then explore the 
effects of method bias by considering to what extent changing publishing standards can 
influence the kind of evidence which is generated in the population, and the make-up of the 
population in terms of strategies.  
According to our model, method bias can maintain a diversity of strategies and evidence in a 
community. This can occur even when the landscape heavily favours one strategy over another. 
Moreover, making it easier for the disadvantaged strategy is more effective than making it 
harder for the favoured strategy. Finally, the trade-off between method bias and a community’s 
productivity is not simple: often gains in one arena are not equally matched by losses in 
another. This suggests that under some conditions maintaining a diversity of scientific 
strategies can actually increase the productivity of a community overall. Before describing our 
simulation work, in section 2 we’ll analyse sharpness and independence. 
Our primary goal in this paper, then, is to identify and analyse an otherwise unnoticed kind 
of bias whose recognition is made possible through a commitment to method pluralism and a 
recognition that some methods are more useful in some contexts than others. In doing so, we 
also make original use of ‘epistemic landscape’ models, both in the dynamics they instantiate 
and how we interpret them. We’ll finish in section 6 by discussing circumstances in which 
method bias might be particularly egregious, and by arguing that philosophical analysis which 
approaches evidence abstracted from aspects of epistemic situations—community standards in 
particular—are inadequate for many instances of knowledge-generation in science. 
2. Sharpness & Independence 
In this section we provide conceptual underpinnings for the remainder of the paper. 
Although methodological pluralism takes diverse forms, it suits our modelling approach to focus 
on two diverging properties of evidence: ‘sharpness’ and ‘independence’. We’ll first briefly 
discuss method pluralism, before spending some time developing and clarifying these two 
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evidential properties, and briefly pointing to examples where these notions are plausibly in 
scientific play. 
A ‘scientific method’ is a strategy for doing science: how should scientists go about 
generating knowledge? The kind of ‘disunity’ or ‘pluralism’ that concerns us here denies that 
science can be unified by a single method3 (see Feyarabend 1975 for a classic defence of this 
claim). That is, there is no one privileged strategy for generating scientific knowledge that is 
distinctive of it. Rather, method is context sensitive. There is room for disagreement about 
which aspects of context matter, and to what extent: some emphasize the social and political4, 
others research’s public import5, others the kinds of systems the investigation targets6. 
Regardless, that good science admits a plurality of method—that it is ‘disunified’—we take to be 
generally agreed upon. 
In our model, agents adopting different strategies compete by trying to maximize different 
properties of evidence. We’ll call one ‘sharpness’, the other ‘independence’. It is useful to begin 
with the old truth that observations do not count as evidence for or against a hypothesis 
simplicita: bodies of background theory are required to connect our hypothesis-driven 
expectations with an investigation’s results7. The relationship between background theory and 
evidence underwrites two evidential properties. 
On the one hand, evidence can be more-or-less sharp. Brandon (1997) understands how 
‘experimental’ a study is in part by the extent to which experimental results test the relevant 
hypothesis. The epistemic ‘power’ of a result, or set of results, to establish or falsify a conjecture, 
varies. Sharpness, then, is a relationship between results and hypotheses. Dull results are 
ambiguous vis-à-vis hypotheses, sharp evidence speaks clearly and firmly. For this to occur, 
                                                             
3 It is worth pointing out that this disunity thesis is weaker, and does not necessarily come hand-in-
hand with the stronger metaphysical claims of Dupre (1995) and Cartwright (1999). 
4 See, for instance, Shapin & Schaffer (1985) 
5 For instance Douglas (2000), Brown (2013). 
6 Currie & Walsh (2018), Weisberg (2012), Matthewson (2011) 
7 See, for instance, Bogen & Woodward (1988). 
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background theory must both connect the investigation’s results to the hypothesis, and 
alternatives must be accounted for. 
Sharpness is best understood probabilistically. Evidence is sharp vis-à-vis a hypothesis to 
the extent to which the unconditional probability of the hypothesis is lower than its likelihood 
given the evidence in question. That is, sharp evidence has a high likelihood ratio. In Bayesian 
terms, ‘sharpness’ is a measure of how much we should update our beliefs in light of the 
evidence. Dull evidence will raise our credence but a little, while sharp evidence has major 
effects8. It is plausible that many experimental strategies aim to maximize sharpness (consider 
Cleland 2002, for instance). Controlling for confounding factors lowers ambiguity; the results 
exclude more possibilities. Multiple runs, controlled conditions, and other features of 
experiments make for powerful, convincing, sharp results. 
On the other hand, variety-of-evidence reasoning relies on independence. We can 
understand ‘independence’ as the extent to which lines of evidence rely on varied background 
theories. Consider proxies of past temperature. Surface temperature fluctuations in the deep 
past can be detected by (among other things) boreholes, and preserved pollen grains in 
sediment. First, the temperature variation at different vertical positions of boreholes tracks 
temperature variation at the time of deposition. Second, pollen quantity tracks plant 
productivity and as this is sensitive to temperature, fluctuations in pollen quantity can tell us 
about temperature fluctuations across time. Again, data is not evidence for free: borehole 
temperature must be controlled against warmth from the Earth’s core, for instance. So, both 
                                                             
8 Things are not as simple as they may seem here: on many Bayesian accounts evidence for a 
proposition has diminishing returns, that is, if my confidence is already very high, evidence which in other 
contexts might be very telling would, on this account, be dull. There are several moves open here. One 
might adopt a 4-place account of sharpness, relative to (1) the hypothesis in question, (2) the 
observations or data, (3) background theory, and (4) the current beliefs of the relevant agents (this could 
be a three place account if background theory determines current beliefs). Alternatively, one might adopt 
a counterfactual account, understanding sharpness as the amount by which a rational agent’s credence 
would increase in light of the evidence if their priors were suitably low. Or, one could abandon the 
subjectivism of Bayesianism and adopt an externalist account of evidence: thus, there is some non-agent-
relative fact of the matter about sharpness. There may be subtle differences in the construal of our model 
based on these decisions, but as we discuss in footnote 21, our model will cohere with a wide variety of 
precisifications. 
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proxies require background theory for evidential relevance but—crucially—they require 
different background theory. That is, they are independent, and independence can sometimes 
carry important epistemic consequences (see Forber & Griffith 2011, Fitelson 2001, Heesen, 
Bright & Zucker 2014, Stegenga 2009)9.  
Imagine that both borehole and pollen data converge on the same pattern of past 
temperature. Because the evidence relies on different bodies of background theory, for the 
world to refuse to cooperate—that is, for the convergent predictions to turn out false—distinct 
failures are required. If temperature estimates from both borehole and pollen data converge, 
but those estimations are false, separate mistakes are required for each source. Perhaps our 
method for pollen-gathering introduces bias; perhaps interior warming in our analysis of 
borehole data was faulty. In this circumstance, the convergence would be a, perhaps very 
unlikely, coincidence. Independence, then, is a virtue. Under the right conditions, if the 
measures converge on the same result, then it is likely to be the right result, as otherwise both 
must mess up, but coincidentally converge. If, however, data relies on overlapping background 
theory, then a single mistake can lead to the failure of both. Independence is graded: some 
measures will have more-or-less overlapping justification. And indeed, overlaps can be more-or-
less problematic depending on how firmly established the overlapping theory is. Although 
independence is in principle a virtue, it is important to note its in-practice limitations. Evidence 
generated from different procedures can be incongruent: background theory is required to 
‘translate’ between evidence generated by different procedures using different language 
(Stegenga 2011). Further, often different evidence is used to support different aspects of a 
hypothesis: they merely cohere rather than converge in the sense independence requires 
(Currie 2018, chapter 8, also Mayo-Wilson 2011)10.  
                                                             
9 The term ‘robustness’ is sometimes used in discussion of ‘independence’, we prefer the latter term 
as ‘robustness’ is also used to discuss virtues of models and experimental setups which are not directly 
related to the evidence they generate. 
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting these clarifications. 
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Nancy Cartwright (2007) makes a related evidential distinction, and it is worth clarifying 
the difference between her approach and ours. She distinguishes between clinchers: a form of 
evidence which is very strong—deductive—but narrow in scope, and vouchers, broader 
evidence which simply adds inductive weight, but doesn’t ‘clinch’ the deal for the hypothesis in 
question. Clinchers are narrow because of their deductive nature: “The assumptions necessary 
for their successful application will have to be extremely restrictive and they can take only a 
very specialized type of evidence as input and special forms of conclusion as output” (6). 
Evidence’s sharpness, or the independence of a set of evidence, doesn’t entail whether we 
should think of that evidence as a clincher or a voucher: that turns on how restrictive the 
assumptions, and how special the outputs and inputs must be, for evidential relevance. 
However, as we’ll mention in section 6.1, highly sharp evidence is likely to have the restricted 
scope that Cartwright identifies with clinchers. 11 We can further specify sharpness and 
independence using formal machinery. We don’t think the formal machinery is strictly-speaking 
necessary for our purposes, and less technically-minded readers might prefer to go straight to 
section 3. 
Consider two situations. In situation 1, we are trying to establish whether hypothesis h is 
true. Our prior is low, say 𝑝(ℎ) =  0.01 (perhaps h is a putative causal pathway, and there are 
numerous possible pathways consistent with our background knowledge). By investing 
resources we can increasingly refine a method m that will generate data set D. Given 
background knowledge, we know that if the data set yields evidence that confirms our 
hypothesised pathway, that evidence will be powerful, say 𝑝(ℎ|𝑒) =  0.95. Furthermore, our 
background knowledge could indicate that the data set D is likely to produce evidence for one, 
and only one, of the competing hypotheses we are currently entertaining within set H, such that, 
say, 
                                                             
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing us towards Cartwright’s distinction. 
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𝑝(ℎ𝑖) = 0.01 ∩ 𝑝(ℎ𝑖|𝑒𝑖) =  0.95 ∩ 𝑝(ℎ𝑗≠𝑖|𝑒𝑖) = 𝜀 ∩ 𝑝(¬ ⋃ 𝑒𝑘
𝑘
|𝐷) =  0.05, ℎ𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝐻 
Then we’ll say method m is very sharp.  
In situation 2 we will have two methods, m1 and m2, generating data sets D1 and D2. 
Following notation from above, the situation here will be of dull evidence: 
∀𝐷, 𝑝(ℎ𝑖) = 0.01 ∩ 𝑝(ℎ𝑖|𝑒𝑖) =  0.04 ∩ 𝑝(ℎ𝑗≠𝑖|𝑒𝑖) = 0.03 ∩ 𝑝(¬ ⋃ 𝑒𝑘|𝐷)
𝑘
=  0.8, ℎ𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝐻 
However, we will add a special boost to the posterior in the case of evidential convergence: 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖|𝑒𝑖,𝐷1 ∩ 𝑒𝑖,𝐷2) = 0.95 ∩ 𝑝(ℎ𝑗≠𝑖|𝑒𝑖,𝐷1 ∩ 𝑒𝑖,𝐷2) = 𝜀 
In such a case we will say the two methods m1 and m2 are highly independent of each other. 
There are other ways one might formalize independence12 but the simulation we introduce in 
section 3 can represent most of these. 
                                                             
12 There are different ways of characterizing independence (thanks to an anonymous referee for 
encouraging us to expand on this point). Stegenga & Menon, for instance, distinguish between 
probabilistic independence (which is closer to what we have in mind) and ontological independence 
(2017). Although we discuss independence in terms of (lack of) overlap in background theory; there are 
other ways to go within a Bayesian framework, and subtleties to how one formalises it with respect to 
different measures of evidential support (Fitelson 2001). We take independence to be a relationship 
between two (or more) instances of evidence (E1 and E2) and a hypothesis (H) for which they can 
potentially provide confirmation (and not, it is important to note, a two-way relationship between 
instances of evidence, or methods for generating them). However, a datum does not become evidence for 
(or against) a particular hypothesis without the background knowledge (K) that connects the datum to 
the hypothesis and allows it to perform the role of evidence: 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻 ∩ 𝐾) > 𝑃(𝐸|¬𝐻 ∩ 𝐾), 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻 ∩
¬𝐾) ≈ 𝑃(𝐸|¬𝐻 ∩ ¬𝐾). Thus we get to our notion of independence: it is the extent to which the parts of 
the background knowledge (K1 and K2) that underpin the confirmation relationship between the different 
data and the hypothesis are independent of each other, such that a fault in one would not undermine the 
strength of the other; for independent sources of evidence, 𝑃(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2|𝐻 ∩ 𝐾1 ∩ 𝐾2) >
 𝑃(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2|𝐻 ∩ 𝐾1 ∩ ¬𝐾2) > 𝑃(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2|¬𝐻 ∩ 𝐾1 ∩ ¬𝐾2), whereas for non-independent sources the 
second inequality does not necessarily hold. Another way to look at independence is in terms of the 
hypothesis screening off the probabilistic connection between the different data (Sober 1989). For 
independent sources of evidence, it is the truth of the hypothesis (rather than some other aspect of the 
world) that makes both data turn out in a way that supports the hypothesis. On this view, for independent 
sources of evidence, 𝑃(𝐸2|𝐸1) >  𝑃(𝐸2|𝐸1 ∩ 𝐻). As we’ll discuss below, we think our approach to 
modelling independence (and sharpness, for that matter) handles the majority of approaches to 
precisifying these notions. 
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So, we can distinguish between how sharp evidence is, that is, its lack of ambiguity vis-à-vis a 
hypothesis, given background theory; and its independence, that is, the amount of overlap 
between background theory pertaining to different evidence sources. In our model, both of 
these properties will be represented on a landscape. The former will be the height dimension of 
the landscape – higher values will represent sharper evidence. The latter will be represented as 
distance on the landscape. The distinction also allows us to explain the two strategies adopted 
by agents on the landscape.  
In our model, we will distinguish between two scientific strategies: one attempts to 
maximize sharpness, the other independence. The former strategy is followed by 
methodological obligates: they seek out sources that generate maximally sharp evidence. The 
latter is followed by methodological omnivores: they seek to minimize the overlap in background 
theory between the evidence they have13. Clearly, these strategies are major simplifications of 
actual science; the distinction is drawn for the purposes of modelling. However, we do think 
that some differences in scientific methodology do reflect the obligate/omnivore distinction. 
First, scientists interested in uncovering the past often emphasize the need to ‘do science 
differently’ in the face of a lack of experimental access to their targets and the decay of past 
information (see, for instance, the introduction to Diamond & Robinson 2010, as well as Turner 
2007). In light of this, the extent to which one can rely on a single or a few sources of evidence 
dramatically diminishes: scientists instead adopt a ‘variety-of-reasoning’ strategy which seeks 
to maximize their epistemic reach. Philosophical accounts of historical reasoning often 
emphasize the importance of independence in light of a lack of access to sharp evidence. 
Because in such contexts evidence is often ambiguous, biased and degraded (in our terminology, 
dull), scientists weave together several independent evidence sources (see, in particular, Currie 
2016, 2018, Wylie 2011, 2016, Chapman & Wylie 2016, Forber & Griffith 2011, Vezer 2016). 
                                                             
13 The obligate/omnivore distinction is adapted from Currie (2015, 2018). 
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Second, ecologists are often worried about the legitimacy of their evidential practices (for a 
classic example, see Weiner 1997). As William Bausman has recently discussed (Bausman 2016, 
under review, Bausman & Halina under review), ‘neutral theorists’ complain that ecological 
methodologies which focus on competition-models are epistemically inadequate, because they 
lack the crucial tests provided by null-models. They argue that models without competition 
(neutral models) should be used to test competition models. Competition modellers, in 
response, point to the empirical fruitfulness of their approach. Where one side emphasizes 
statistical testing, the other points to the use of ‘natural experiments’ (Diamond & Robinson 
2010). So, competition theorists approach an ecosystem by positing a set of trophic interactions 
between populations in that ecosystem: patterns of abundance are explained in light of 
interactions between, for instance, predators and prey. As evidence, they cite those population-
level patterns themselves, and less direct evidence from a variety of sources which suggest that, 
in effect, such patterns are often due to trophic interactions. In response, ‘neutral modellers’ 
demand it be shown that those same patterns cannot be generated by models which do not 
posit trophic interactions. We think this debate is plausibly read as a demand for sharpness on 
the part of the neutral theorists, and a defence of variety of evidence reasoning from 
competition theorists. 
Third, defenders of Evidence-Based Medicine are plausibly read as demanding sharpness, 
and denying the value of independence, in the context of approving medicinal treatments. On 
such views, the best evidence (sometimes, in effect, the only admissible evidence) for proving 
the effectiveness of a treatment is a randomised controlled trial and, ideally, a meta-analysis of 
such trials. These are contrasted with anecdotal, narrative, and lab-based mechanistic evidence 
which are considered less important. Others respond that medicine would do better to take a 
‘total evidence view’, including these other evidence-sources in approving medical treatments 
(for general discussion, see Stagenga 2011, Solomon 2015). Here, the evidence-based medicine 
folk appear to be demanding a certain sharpness, while their detractors think that 
independence matters too. 
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To show whether our distinction really captures these debates and others like it, of course, 
would require significantly more argument on our part. The point of this tour is to provide some 
preliminary reason to think that the sharpness/independence distinction has some claim to 
plausibility in practice. In what follows, we’ll contrast two features which might make a 
difference to such debates. First, what we’ll call ‘evidential context’—understood narrowly as 
concerning the effectiveness of those strategies given the nature of the target systems involved, 
the available evidence, and so forth. Second, the beliefs and values of the epistemic community 
at hand. We aim for our model to explore how a community’s beliefs can shape both the kind of 
evidence generated, and the variety and productivity of that community. An upshot of this 
discussion is the reminder that debates about evidence do not occur in a social vacuum: 
understanding why scientists approve of what they do, and how they progress, is not a simple 
matter of considering the appropriate strategy given an evidential context. Social factors 
matter—crucially—as well. 
3. Modelling Method-Pluralism 
Here is not the place for a full defence of the use of agent based models in institutional 
design, but we’ll make a few observations before discussing our model. If, as we argue, method 
bias is a real phenomenon with serious real-world implications, this paper could form part of an 
agenda calling for the redesign of various scientific institutions affected by this bias (e.g. 
publishing and funding institutions). But how does such simulation work feed into such 
agendas? We’ll by and large follow Roth (2002) and Alexandrova & Northcott (2009)’s 
discussions. 
The model presented in this paper is not driven by empirical data, but by idealised 
representations of “reasonable assumptions” about the target domain. Therefore, it may be 
useful to think of the model as a formalised thought experiment. Both thought experiments and 
our model operate by making a complex system “concrete” (in the sense of specific, not in the 
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sense of actual). However, unlike thought experiments, which concretise by loading a 
hypothetical anecdote with what are taken to be exemplary characteristics, the model 
concretises by assigning numerical parameters to what are taken to be key processes. 
In the design of the model, the usefulness of the concretisation relies on our judgements of 
what is reasonable and what is important. The designer's judgement is called upon twice: in the 
choice of relevant processes, and in their numerical parametrisation. Due to its reliance on 
largely untested beliefs about what is relevant and what is reasonable, the model is not 
predictive. Nonetheless, in the best scenario it can serve as a template for predictive hypotheses, 
once the relevant data have been gathered. In this capacity it can also serve as a guide to data 
collection, prioritising some data-gathering activities over others. Further, the concretization 
model-building provides allows us to see how our ideas might interact, thus revealing important 
connections between them.  
A useful way of approaching questions about diversity in science co-opt landscape models 
from evolutionary biology14. A standard evolutionary landscape consists of three dimensions, X, 
Y and Z. X and Y form a two dimensional grid: locations representing genotypes. A third 
dimension—Z—adds a topography to this grid, representing the fitness of various genotypes. 
Agents explore the landscape according to various rules. In evolutionary landscapes agents are 
typically ‘hill-climbers’, shifting from lower to higher locations on the grid. This is useful for 
representing, for instance, local fitness traps: an agent may reach local optima, but due to 
‘valleys’ be unable to reach higher ground15.  
Philosophers and sociologists of science have reconceived such landscapes in epistemic 
terms. Typically (following Weisberg & Muldoon 2009) locations on the X, Y grid represent 
topics that a scientist might decide to pursue, while the Z axis represents the significance of a 
                                                             
14 Wright (1932) 
15 Though see Gavrilets (2004) for criticism of this use stemming from the pernicious simplifying use 
of low (two) dimensions to represent a high dimensionality space. We note this criticism doesn’t bite as 
strongly for our model since our agents are not local hill-climbers, as described below. 
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result—i.e., the local optima might represent a publication in a top journal. In this context, 
philosophers have asked which search-strategies are more likely to locate peaks in the 
landscape: typically ‘follower’ strategies, which piggyback on already explored locations are 
contrasted with ‘maverick’ strategies, which prefer unexplored areas. 
In our case, we’re interested in a different set of questions: first, the relationship between 
epistemic situation and evidence-gathering strategy; second, the relationship between 
evidence-generation and method bias. As such, our model differs from previous work both in 
terms of its dynamics—as we’ll see, these are more complex—and in terms of construal. Where 
X, Y coordinates represent topics for Weisberg & Muldoon, for us they represent methods: 
particular investigative techniques. Where the Z axis previously represented significance, we’ll 
take it to mean sharpness, such that the height of each location is the sharpness of the evidence 
produced by that particular method. Further, distance between X, Y coordinates in our model 
represents the overlap between background theory which underwrites methods, that is, 
independence. 
A common criticism of existing epistemic landscape models is that neither height of 
individual points on the landscape, nor distance between points on the landscape have rigorous 
philosophical underpinnings16. In our model, both of these parameters are clearer. Each 
parameter (height and distance) maps directly to the goals of obligates and omnivores 
respectively, namely sharpness (degree of belief update following evidence) and independence 
(degree of information overlap between two different kinds of evidence, given background 
knowledge)17. As such, we conceive of each location, given by a specified (x, y) coordinate, as 
representing a method of data generation, and of landscape ‘height’ (Z axis) as evidence 
sharpness: the higher the point, the sharper the evidence produced by the method given 
                                                             
16 See criticism of current lack of solid foundations in Avin (2015), ch. 2. See Avin (2015) ch. 3 for an 
attempt to provide such a foundation. 
17 Though note possible complications arising from the subjective nature of background belief and 
belief update, as noted in footnote 8, and from various interpretations of independence, as noted in 
footnote 12. 
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background knowledge. Distance in the landscape – on the X-Y plane —represents 
independence18: the further apart two methods are, the more independent their evidence 
outputs will be from each other, i.e. less shared background theory goes into linking the 
evidence streams to a hypothesis19. The basic idea is that obligate and omnivore agents pursue 
research programs preferring sharpness or independence. By manipulating landscape 
topography, and publishing requirements, we can examine the relationship between 
methodological strategy, epistemic situation, and method bias.  
What do we take our model to be a model of? At minimum, a population of scientists are 
interested in which evidential sources and tests will lead them to the truth concerning some 
particular hypothesis or set of hypotheses. One group of scientists—the obligates—bet that 
sharp evidence is the way to go, while another—omnivores—seek out independence20. Our 
model captures a set of minimal conditions for when two different features of evidence might 
matter within an investigation. One way of capturing these minimal conditions is by appealing 
to the Kuhnian notion of normal science. That is, our model captures circumstances where there 
                                                             
18 As long as the conceptualisation of independence takes the form of a three-way relationship, or 
more generally an (n+1)-way relationship for a hypothesis and n instances of evidence, and as long as 
independence is taken to be gradual (such that overlap of background knowledge, or amount of 
screening, can vary along a spectrum), we can associate, for a given hypothesis (or set of mutually-
inconsistent hypotheses) the degree of independence with a distance metric, and use it to map various 
evidential sources onto a landscape. We use this property in the simulations that follow, and our results 
should hold for any conceptualisation of independence that allows associating a distance metric to a 
collection of evidence instances or sources, vis-à-vis a hypothesis under consideration. 
19 Given this notion of distance we also chose a bounded, non-toroidal topology for our model. 
20 We can view this situation through Bayesian eyes. There’s a set of hypotheses under consideration, 
and a range of evidential sources which could provide confirmation of one hypothesis against others. We 
care about two properties of evidence in relation to the hypothesis set. One is a direct confirmation 
relationship that maps an evidence source and a hypothesis set to a degree of confirmation for the best 
supported hypothesis in the set 𝑓1(𝑒, {ℎ}) → 𝒸 (ℎ𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡). The other is a relational confirmation relationship 
that maps a set of evidence sources and a hypotheses set to a degree of confirmation for the best 
supported hypothesis in the set 𝑓2({𝑒}, {ℎ}) → 𝒸(ℎ𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡). In our model we cash these out in terms of 
sharpness and independence respectively, but our simulation results should hold for any way of factoring 
the confirmation relationship into two complementary relationships, one that emphasises the direct link 
between an evidence source and a hypothesis, and the other that emphasises the relations between 
evidence sources (all of this, of course, should take into account general- and evidence-source-specific- 
background knowledge). 
16 
 
is more-or-less agreement about what hypotheses matter, how evidence effects those 
hypotheses, and so on21.  
As mentioned above, our landscape is a three-dimensional configuration space. Agents 
interact with the landscape, generating evidence and publishing their results. Agents are 
distinguished by how they do so: obligates prefer to pursue sharpness, and will publish when 
sufficient sharpness is reached; omnivores will prefer independence, and will publish when they 
collect a body of evidence that spans a sufficiently diverse background. We can represent 
method bias by manipulating publishing requirements.  
The model is evolutionary: after set time periods the ratio of obligates to omnivores is 
altered, with some agents “defecting” to the “winning” strategy, where “winning” is determined 
by the number of publications attributed to each strategy. We don’t mean for these evolutionary 
dynamics to represent the development of actual scientific communities over time. Rather, the 
revealed evolutionary trajectories show how different publishing requirements and landscape 
topographies favour different research strategies. 
In designing the model, we ran calibration simulations which explored ranges of reasonable 
parameter values to find combinations of landscape topography, agent strategies, and 
publication thresholds that consistently result in landscapes where both obligates and 
omnivores survive in dynamic equilibrium near a 50%/50% population split. We used these 
parameter configurations to establish “neutral” landscapes and publication thresholds that we 
could then vary to explore the effects of method mismatch and method bias. The values which 
                                                             
21 More explicitly, we take a straightforward model interpretation to require (1) general community 
agreement about the hypothesis set under consideration {h}, (2) an a posteriori agreement about the 
admissible evidence set {e} (this is a posteriori because evidential sources are initially unknown to the 
community members, but we require that once a method is discovered its results are accepted as 
evidence by the knowledge gatekeepers of the community), and (3) agreement within each sub-
community pursuing one of f1 or f2 about their values (which can be cached out, for example, by 
demanding agreement about the background knowledge required for each evidence source).   
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determine, for instance, agent behaviour are therefore not arbitrary at least in this minimal 
sense. 
Let’s highlight some model features one-by-one22. 
3.1 Landscape values 
We utilise the three dimensions of the landscape (distance along the X dimension, distance 
along the Y dimension, and height along the Z dimension) to represent the two distinct qualities 
of evidence discussed above: sharpness and independence. Our landscape is dynamic, with 
sharpness values allowed to vary over the course of the simulation.  
The Z axis (sharpness) of a landscape consists in both a potential value or ‘ceiling’ and an 
actual value. At the beginning of a simulation run, the potential value is created by adding 
randomly shaped bivariate Gaussians to a flat landscape. The initial actual value is then set to 
some fraction of the potential value. By ‘generating’ (see below), agents can increase the 
exploitable landscape to above the initial actual values, but it can only exceed the ceiling under 
special circumstances23. When agents ‘exploit’ (see below) the actual value along the Z-axis 
decreases. When the actual value of sharpness changes, it changes for all agents in the model; 
there is only one unchanging ‘potential’ landscape throughout the simulation, and at any given 
simulation step only one ‘actual’ landscape, which are shared by all agents. 
In addition to sharpness—the Z value—we’re also interested in independence. This is 
roughly the distance between two locations on the X, Y grid. Distance is an infamous source of 
trouble for landscape models24. In evolutionary models, it is plausibly read as similarity 
between genotypes; in epistemic models, similarity between investigations or techniques. But in 
what sense are genotypes or techniques similar; and is this similarity reasonably represented in 
                                                             
22 Both the model’s code and an expanded explanation of the model’s variables and operation can be 
found online at https://github.com/shaharavin/method-bias/. 
23 If two peaks overlap, the total value can exceed the ceiling. 
24 Stadler et al (2001), Avin (2015, ch. 3) 
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two dimensions? On our construal, distance is not a measure of similarity, but of overlap 
between background theories which underwrite methods. We don’t doubt that there is much 
more to be said in working out precisely what this amounts to, but insofar as it relies on a 
notion of overlap rather than similarity it is, we think, an improvement. 
So, distance is conceived as a measure of independence: methods close to each other in the 
landscape have significant overlap in background theory, while those far apart have less 
overlap. When extending from distance, a 2-way relationship, to an N-way relationship, we 
measure the independence of a set of methods as the area of the polygon bounding the 
coordinates corresponding to these methods. An important variable regarding distance is the 
clustering of peaks. An initial variable determines to what extent peaks are distributed within 
the landscape: high values lead to peaks clustering in the centre, such that the area of the 
polygon bounding the highest peaks is small relative to the size of the landscape (low 
independence); low values of clustering lead to a wider distribution of peaks, a larger bounding 
polygon, and higher independence. Unlike sharpness, the degree of independence of different 
methods (the X and Y coordinates of methods) remains fixed throughout the simulation; 
however, as sharpness varies, sometimes a method becomes so dull (‘0’ sharpness) that it is no 
longer worth pursuing, at which point it would not contribute to independence, and so the 
potential for generating independent evidence on the landscape changes over time even as 
distances remain fixed.  
3.2 Agent behaviours 
At the beginning of the simulation, agents are seeded on the landscape in random locations. 
Each turn, agents perform one of 4 behaviours, and an agent’s strategy (omnivore or obligate) 
dictates how likely they are to perform each behaviour. If a behaviour is selected that the agent 
cannot perform that turn, they select a new behaviour with the unavailable behaviour removed. 
Let’s examine each behaviour. 
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3.2.1  Exploration 
In the model each agent tracks their own ‘vision’, representing the methods each scientist 
knows about and can deploy to generate evidence; vision is not shared between agents. At a 
simulation run’s beginning, each agent’s vision is restricted to a radius around their initial 
position.25 When an agent explores they shift their position to a random unexplored spot on the 
landscape (allowing ‘hopping’) and update their vision. We can imagine exploration as a set of 
quite disparate scientific activities: literature reviews, field work, and so forth. As the simulation 
proceeds, agents uncover increasing amount of the landscape. Agents never lose vision of 
previously explored areas, and can ‘see’ changes to sharpness caused by other agents (see 
below). 
3.2.2  Exploitation 
‘Exploitation’ mines evidence from the landscape. Agents are unrestricted spatially—they 
can exploit any visible (to them) spot on the landscape.  On exploitation an agent scans known 
locales and selects the best spot according to their strategy (see below). Once a spot is selected, 
the evidence for that position—its sharpness and location (which affects independence)—is 
added to the agent’s evidence stack. Exploitation also changes topography to reflect both 
diminishing returns in evidential sharpness and loss of novelty. The actual height of the position 
is decreased by a fixed fraction of the ceiling. Note that reduction is shallow and surgical: the 
landscape doesn’t reduce completely, and the surrounding landscape is more-or-less unscathed. 
We can imagine exploitation as scientists producing data: analysing fossils, say, or running an 
experiment. 
3.2.3  Generation 
                                                             
25 We used a radius of 5 for vision updates, using Moore neighborhood (all grid locations within 
distance 5 and within the grid’s bounds). 
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Scientists do not simply run experiments, they also must design them; palaeontologists do 
not only analyse fossils, they must find them, and produce new methods for doing so. 
Generation is a way of modelling this activity. When an agent generates, actual landscape value 
increases both at their current position and at a randomly selected spot. The extra spot is to 
represent the indirect upshots of new techniques. The two peaks are both generated at the 
potential value of their respective locations. Generation is time-consuming, but agents get first 
dibs on accessing the fruits of their labour—after generation is complete the agent immediately 
exploits. 
3.2.4  Submit 
Once an agent’s evidence stack meets a certain threshold (threshold is strategy-dependent, 
see below) they are able to submit their evidence for publication. The submitting agent’s 
evidence stack is cleared, and a new publication with that evidence emerges. The publication 
records both which agent produced it, and the strategy of the agent. Publication quantity per 
strategy determines the ratio of strategies at the beginning of the next episode (see below).  
3.3  Agent strategies 
Agents adopt one of two strategies, defined by how likely they are to perform actions (their 
weighting), and by the sufficiency conditions for publication.  
Omnivores are scientists who value independent evidence: they are likely to seek out new 
methods, techniques and data-sources and this is reflected in their tendency to prefer 
exploration. Their bar for publication submission is determined by the independence of their 
stack of evidence. In the first experiment, they may publish once the area of the bounding 
polygon of their evidence stack is greater than or equal to 1/5 of the landscape area (the X, Y 
dimensions). They are twice as likely to explore as they are to generate, exploit or submit. This 
represents ‘variety-of-evidence’ reasoning. When an omnivore exploits, they select locations 
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which are maximally distant from the locations in their evidence stack (so long as that location 
has at least some non-zero value in terms of sharpness). 
Obligates are scientists who value sharpness: they are less likely to look for different kinds 
of evidence, but instead prefer to focus on developing a promising area. Their bar for 
publication is determined by the total sharpness of their stack of evidence.  In the first 
experiment, this is when the sum of the evidence sharpness is greater than three times the 
landscape’s ceiling. They generate and exploit twice as often as they submit, and only explore 
half as often as they submit. This represents the kind of reasoning we see in much experimental 
science: careful, controlled studies are the focus. Obligates select the highest visible peak when 
exploiting. 
Table 1 Agent strategies and associated behaviour likelihoods and publication criteria 
 Explore 
Prob. 
Generate 
Prob. 
Exploit 
Prob. 
Submit 
Prob. 
Publish (in 
1st and 2nd 
experiment) 
Obligate 1 / 11 4 / 11 4 / 11 2 / 11 Total evidence 
sharpness > 3x 
the ceiling 
Omnivore 2 / 5 1 / 5 1 / 5 1 / 5 Polygon area of 
evidence > 1/5 
landscape area 
  
3.4 Simulation Runs 
At the beginning of a simulation, various initial parameters are set, including agent number, 
landscape size, and so forth. Agents are seeded and each performs one action per turn (unless 
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they have generated, at which point no action is taken for 6 turns). At the end of an episode 
(which is a set number of turns) the ratio of omnivores to obligates is updated to reflect the 
relative success of each strategy in publishing papers. We take a turn to represent 3 months of 
research: a very coarse estimate of a field-season, or an experimental run.  
Figure 1 shows a series of snapshots from a sample simulation run. Variations in colour 
indicate landscape values, with the blue end of the spectrum representing low values, and red 
high. Between snapshots, exploitation leads to reduction in local sharpness (less red, more 
blue), while generation leads to increases in sharpness. Locations obligates exploit are marked 
with black dots and cluster around the highest peaks; locations omnivores exploit are marked 
with white dots and tend to occur on the periphery of the landscape. 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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(e) (f) 
Figure 1. Snapshots of a sample simulation run. X- and Y-axes map to landscape coordinates, 
and colours represent height (from dark blue which is lowest to dark red which is highest). 
The locations where agents exploit are marked on the landscape as well, with black dots for 
obligate exploitation and white dots for omnivore exploitation. The series shows the 
landscape dynamics following generation and exploitation. 
4. Experiments: Topography & Strategy 
The literature on methodological pluralism implies that caring about independence or 
sharpness—that is, adopting omnivore or obligate strategies—is in part a response to epistemic 
situation. We can understand an epistemic situation as concerning, first, an evidential context, 
that is, the kinds of evidence-sources which are available, and second, a broader set of social 
influences. Our landscape is intended to represent the former (we examine the latter by shifting 
publication requirements in the next section). Obligates should flourish when there are rich 
seams of evidence to exploit (clustered, tall peaks), while omnivores should do well when the 
epistemic landscape is more diffuse and sparse. We ran two experiments to establish that in our 
model the success of a strategy is sensitive to landscape topography, which reasonably 
represents evidential context. 
4.1 Experiment 1: Abundance 
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What’s the relationship between total landscape abundance (that is, the sum of heights of all 
landscape coordinates) and whether the landscape favours obligate or omnivore strategies? A 
circumstance with bountiful, sharp evidence should encourage scientists to focus on sharpness. 
When evidence is duller, a strategy of focusing on variety-of-evidence reasoning is more 
appropriate. And indeed, in our model increasing abundance leads to higher obligate favouring, 
lower abundance leads to higher omnivore favouring (See fig 2). 
 
Figure 2: Plot of omnivore ratio relative to the total population at simulation end (after 150 steps), as a 
function of total landscape abundance, averaged over 50 runs (error bars show one standard deviation). 
Figure 2 represents fifty simulation runs per value of total landscape abundance. The 
vertical axis represents the ratio of omnivores to the total population, the horizontal axis 
represents landscape abundance. There is a clear pattern: landscapes of low abundance are 
dominated by omnivores, at higher values obligates are favoured. These results are reason to 
think that our model is behaving as it should: sharpness-rich circumstances encourage obligate 
strategies. 
4.2 Experiment 2: Clustering 
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In a further experiment on the relationship between topography and strategy, we altered 
the spread of value in the landscape. We in effect kept total abundance and landscape ceiling 
steady26, but varied the distribution of value across the landscapes. We predicted that 
landscapes with concentrated value at or near the centre would favour obligates, while 
landscapes with value spread across the landscape would favour omnivores. By manipulating 
landscape clustering while holding abundance fixed, we thus examined the relationship 
between how distributed evidence is, and the success of strategies (fig 3).
 
Figure 3: Omnivore ratio as a function of peak clustering. 
Again, in the figure the vertical axis represents omnivore ratio to the total population at the 
end of the simulation. The horizontal axis represents clustering, where low values place no 
restriction on initial peak placement, and higher values increasingly restrict peaks to the centre 
of the landscape. We ran fifty simulations for each value of the clustering parameter shown in 
the figure. Sure enough, increasing clustering favoured obligates, lowering it favoured 
omnivores. 
                                                             
26 There is some variation due to peak overlaps. 
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5. Experiments: Bias 
The first two experiments established the relationship between strategy success and 
landscape topography. In effect, this shows that our model behaves as it ought: landscapes with 
abundant, sharp, clustered evidence favour obligates; unabundant, dull, dispersed landscapes 
favour omnivores. We construe this as representing the kinds of differences between sciences 
discussed in section 2. Where some scientists seek ‘rich veins’ of sharp evidence, others adopt 
variety-of-evidence reasoning to mitigate the ambiguity of their data. Having established that 
different strategies were favoured in different topographies, we now introduce publishing bias 
to see how it effects favouring. We can introduce bias by shifting the sufficiency for publication 
in one strategy but not another. Recall that epistemic situations include both evidential 
contexts—represented by the landscape—and broader social aspects. We take publication bias 
to coarsely represent these broader aspects—and indeed, our models are intended to show how 
crucial these are. 
We should disambiguate two ways in which publishers might be ‘unbiased’. On the one 
hand, a ‘laisse-faire’ bias takes an unbiased publisher to go, as it were, with the evidential 
context. They will not attempt to interfere with the ‘natural’ path of things. On the other hand, a 
‘balanced’ notion of bias understands unbiased publishers as striving for an even split between 
strategies. They will sometimes work against the evidential context to ensure that as close as 
possible to equal proportions are present. These differing conceptions are unproblematic for 
our purposes: ‘bias’ is simply the comparative ease of publishing for the various strategies 
(irrelevant of topography). Whether bias is egregious, indifferent, or positive is not built into 
our model—this depends on context and the goals at hand. 
5.1 Experiment 3: Method Bias 
We know that certain landscapes favour certain strategies: clustered, abundant landscapes 
favour obligates, dispersed, sparse landscapes favour omnivores. Can method bias, here in its 
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guise of publishing standards, work against or mitigate the strategies favoured by the 
landscape? To answer this, we conducted a series of experiments where the publishing 
requirements for one strategy were increased while the other remained steady. 
In the experiment below, we track omnivore ratio against an omnivore publishing bias in a 
landscape which highly favours obligates (high clustering and abundance). Low values on the 
horizontal axis represent low standards for omnivore publishing – roughly, the lower the value, 
the easier it is for omnivores to publish.  
 
Figure 4: Omnivore ratio as a function of omnivore publication threshold on an obligate-favouring 
landscape. 
In an epistemic landscape so favouring of obligates, things must be made very easy to keep 
omnivores in the population. Even at our highest publishing bias, under ¼ of the population are 
omnivores. However, the bias does keep them in the population—where, under usual 
conditions, topography would exclude omnivores, diversity can be maintained using publishing 
bias.  
Further, (and unsurprisingly), publishing bias can also affect both the amount of sharpness 
and independence extracted from a landscape. 
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Figure 5: Total independence summed across all publications as a function of omnivore publication 
threshold on an obligate-favouring landscape. 
This graph charts omnivore publishing bias on the horizontal axis (as before) but this time 
tracks the total amount of evidential independence on the vertical axis. The results are 
remarkably similar to those previously, and this makes sense: as publishing bias keeps more 
omnivores in a population, and those omnivores will focus on producing highly-independent 
evidence, we should expect the total population to produce more independence of evidence. 
The lesson here is that publishing bias can effect evidence generation in two ways. Firstly, it 
can maintain methodologically mismatched strategies in a population which would otherwise 
be eliminated. Secondly—and in virtue of this first feature—it can increase the amount of 
evidence quality that is mismatched to the evidential context: bias can increase the 
independence extracted from abundant landscapes or sharpness from diffuse landscapes. 
In the above experiments, we have mitigated the context-matching advantages of the 
obligate by making things easier for the omnivores. In the next study, we leave the omnivores’ 
publication thresholds as are, but make it trickier for the obligates. 
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Figure 6: Total independence as a function of obligate publication threshold on an obligate-favouring 
landscape. 
Figure 6 plots total independence (vertical axis) against obligate-bias (horizontal axis) in an 
obligate-favouring landscape. We’ve seen above that total independence in this kind of 
landscape is a good proxy for both epistemic and strategic diversity. We see that there is no 
discernible pattern—making things easier or harder for the context-matching obligates doesn’t 
seem to make a systematic difference to the amount of independence produced. A tempting 
lesson to draw here is that publishing bias produces more diversity when favouring the 
mismatched than disfavouring the matched. As mentioned above, such conclusions are not 
prescriptive, both because the model is agnostic with respect to the valence of bias, and because 
it is too idealised for direct application to science policy.  
Nonetheless, we offer here a template for a causal hypothesis that could be tested: lowering 
evidential requirements for the method which is less effective in the evidential context (e.g. a 
variety-of-evidence paper in a traditional experimental-sharpness oriented discipline) would 
have more effect than hardening the requirements for a favoured method. Though conceptual 
and methodological hurdles abound, such a hypothesis could conceivably be put to the test. 
5.2  Efficiency cost 
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A further question: what costs are there in overall productivity, and in terms of the evidence 
quality pursued by the context-matching strategy when publishing bias is introduced?  
 
Figure 7: Total sharpness across all publications as a function of omnivore publication threshold on an 
obligate-favouring landscape. 
The above tracks total sharpness (vertical axis) against omnivore bias (horizontal axis), 
again in an obligate-favouring landscape. Undoubtedly, the amount of sharpness extracted from 
a landscape decreases at more extreme omnivore publishing biases (and thus omnivore ratio, 
and total independence). Interestingly, the average amount still increases – although not 
enormously, once error-bars are taken into account—once the bias is lowered to the point 
where, in the previous studies, omnivores left the population. That is, the previous experiments 
showed us that at 0.2 there are next to no omnivores in the population, and yet the trend in 
quality continues its upwards trajectory to 0.25. This suggests that biasing against the 
mismatched methodology can have positive effects to the context-matching methodology—
presumably because it decreases the number of ‘lucky’ omnivores who happen to hang on 
beyond expectations. Bias can, then, operate in both directions: it can increase how focused an 
epistemic community is, by conspiring with the epistemic landscape; or it can increase diversity, 
by working against the landscape. 
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Is the trade-off a fair one? That is, when we encourage the mismatched methodology, do we 
discourage the other in equal amounts? We think not (and this is, presumably, because 
omnivores still produce some sharpness, and obligates some independence). To draw a 
comparison, we ran a series of experiments which looked at a neutral landscape, an omnivore-
favouring landscape, and an obligate-favouring landscape. The values in the neutral landscape 
were used as a metric against which the others were valued. The table below tracks the results: 
 Neutral bias Omni bias (for) Obli bias (for) 
Neutral 1,1 0.68,1.38 1.72,0.47 
Omni favouring 0.31,1.69 0.31,2.04 0.46,1.54 
Obli favouring 11.37,0.17 9.08,0.38 11.93,0.16 
 
The first value represents total sharpness, the second total independence. The values are 
indexed to the neutral values. So, for instance, the score of ’11.93’ in the obligate favouring, 
obligate bias landscape in the bottom right corner, represents a nearly 12-fold increase in the 
total amount of sharpness extracted from the (much more abundantly sharp) landscape. These 
results suggest that there is not a fair trade-off in such cases – in fact, the cost paid in the 
advantaged value (the property sought by the context-matched methodology) is less than the 
amount gained in the disadvantaged value. In an obligate-favouring landscape, we pay a cost of 
20% reduction in total sharpness (from 11.37 with no bias to 9.08 with omnivore favouring 
bias), for a 124% increase in the amount of independence generated (from 0.17 to 0.38). A 
similar effect is seen on the omnivore favouring landscape. There, a 9% reduction in total 
independence (from 1.69 to 1.54) is paid to generate a 48% increase in sharpness (from 0.31 to 
0.46). 
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The lesson, we take it, is that although there are costs associated with publishing bias, these 
are neither simple nor fair. In our model, at least, the introduction of bias against the grain does 
not have equal costs for the advantaged value—potentially then, overall efficiency (taking into 
account both sharpness and independence) of the community has increased. Of course, in our 
model we have no non-arbitrary way of combining independence and sharpness into a single 
measure, and so ‘overall efficiency’ is not meaningful in that context27. Regardless, the 
discrepancy between increases of one value and decreases in the other are suggestive. If this 
trade-off can be confirmed empirically, it could support an argument for methodological 
pluralism in epistemic communities—there may be diminishing returns for a particular 
strategy, and much to be gained by having at least a small number of researchers pursuing 
another. 
6. Discussion 
We’ve aimed to provide a systematic way of thinking about method pluralism, to argue that 
methods might not match evidential context, and to explore how bias can both undermine and 
aid us in increasing the efficiency and diversity of epistemic communities. Before concluding, we 
want to make two points. First, we’ll consider the potential downsides of method bias in various 
contexts. Second, we suggest that consideration of method bias should lead us to think that 
community standards about what good science looks like is a necessary component of 
philosophical explanations of scientific evidence. 
6.1 Egregious Method Bias 
                                                             
27 It might be argued that a lack of a unified measure is problematic, but we’re not so sure. First, it’s 
unclear to us whether the kinds of evidence which scientists often bring together are non-arbitrarily 
combined in practice. Second, our focus is not on the evidential value of a landscape per se, but on how 
different publishing practices might affect the makeup of populations. Thanks to Remco Heesen for 
pushing us on this point. 
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Our model does not tell you when method bias is egregious or advantageous; it only 
generates the effects publishing bias might have vis-à-vis methodological pluralism. Whether 
we want to emphasize one kind of evidence, or want a diversity of strategies, or whatever, 
depends crucially on what we want to do with the scientific evidence. A circumstance which 
concerns us is when method bias acts to diminish exactly the kind of evidence we want. For 
example, an emphasis on highly focused—sharp—experimental evidence could lead us to 
misunderstand how our results will play out in the complex, interdependent world beyond the 
lab. Where the costs of getting things wrong matter, and they often do, then getting it right 
involves understanding the limitations of the evidence we are able to generate. 
Egregious method bias and mismatch are particularly problematic in circumstances where 
scientific results are, as it were, in the public eye: when they matter for public policy, for 
instance. Preferring a kind of evidence which is inappropriate to context could result in 
mismanagement, and misunderstanding the stability, accuracy, or trustworthiness of scientific 
claims. Our technological prowess is plausibly outpacing our scientific understanding, and it 
becomes increasingly difficult to understand the impact that interventions (intentional or not) 
might have on complex, large-scale systems. Considering method mismatch and method bias is 
crucial for debates about the validity of scientific studies that attempt to ascertain the effects of 
climate change, the effectiveness of medicinal treatments, the safety of new AI technologies, and 
so forth (Avin et al. 2018). In these contexts, we should ask whether the kinds of evidence we 
demand and want are appropriate to both the task at hand, and the kinds of questions and 
systems we’re interested in knowing about. Insofar as scientific results guide policy, preferring 
one sort of evidence or approach when another is more appropriate could be disastrous. 
Often, the more-or-less unambiguous results of methodological obligates are seen as the 
gold standard of scientific success, but in some contexts this method is inappropriate. And often 
these places are just where such risky gaps in our understanding occur. As Nancy Cartwright 
makes particularly vivid, firmly understood knowledge in highly controlled experimental 
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settings often collapses once it leaves the safe confines of the lab (1993, 1999, 2007). The hunt 
for ‘clinchers’ leads to stable results, but these are very limited in their application. 
Transporting knowledge from laboratory settings into the wild often involves dramatic switches 
in epistemic context; plausibly from a context encouraging an obligate strategy to one favouring 
an omnivore strategy. That is, applying our hard-won knowledge of how things behave in 
controlled settings—where obligate strategies often pay dividends—to the world outside 
requires variety-of-evidence reasoning, as the sheer increased complexity and heterogeneity 
dulls the evidence in the new context. Under these conditions, method bias could lead us to both 
ignore routes to better discoveries and to misjudge the importance and reliability of the 
information we do have. 
6.2 Knowledge Generation & Community Standards 
A further consequence of our discussion of method plurality, bias and mismatch concerns 
what a philosophical account of scientific knowledge should be like. Philosophers have often 
approached scientific evidence narrowly: the philosophical task vis-à-vis scientific evidence 
requires understanding confirmation. That is, explaining the relationship between observations 
and hypotheses. It strikes us that consideration of method bias puts pressure on such narrow 
conceptions.  
One (admittedly caricatured) illustration of a narrow conception appeals to the distinction 
between contexts of justification and discovery. Originally coined by Reichenbach (1938, 
although his distinction was quite nuanced, see Schickore 2014), the distinction was used to 
carve out a place for philosophical analysis vis-à-vis science. Roughly speaking, discovery is the 
processes by which scientists conceive of, and come to, scientific theories, as well as the 
business of generating evidence. Justification involves understanding the connection between 
evidence and theories. One way of defending a narrow conception of science is to say the latter, 
rather than the former, is the proper target of analysis (as Popper argued in the Logic of 
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Scientific Discovery, 1935). The logical and abstract questions of justification are the 
philosopher’s playground, while the messy, human side can be relegated to the dustbin of 
‘discovery’. As such, when philosophers consider science, we should enquire after the 
connection between theories, evidence, and the world—understanding those issues provides 
the philosophical essence of science. 
Philosophers have applied pressure on these views for a long time. The narrow view misses 
important aspects of scientific practice necessary for understanding its very success, progress 
and stability. Such arguments take multiple forms. One set argues that justification itself has 
non-epistemic properties, often due to inductive risk (Douglas 2000). Another set argues that 
justification is found in places usually associated with discovery: specifically, the social 
organization of science plays an important role in preserving and supporting its stability 
(Longino 1990). A third set argues that scientific goods, the outputs and aims of their 
investigations, are not limited to well-supported theories—scientists are also interested in 
building storehouses of data (Hacking 1993), or provisioning understanding (Potochnik 2017), 
and so on. What unifies these critiques is the claim that narrow conceptions are just too narrow.  
Our critique is complementary: as evidence comes in a range of flavours, and (crucially) in 
different contexts some flavours perform better than others, combining them into a single 
relation between hypotheses and theories, obscures the different work they do28. And indeed, 
this becomes particularly problematic in light of method bias. If different communities have 
different ideas about what good science is like, and use these to guide how the community 
develops, understanding different evidential properties and scientific strategies is necessary for 
understanding that evidence. That is, the relationships between evidential context and 
                                                             
28 We think analogous arguments can be found. Toulmin’s position that scientific reasoning should 
focus on warrants rather than logical relationships (1958) and Norton’s defence of a material theory of 
induction (2003) both can be read as making something like this argument. 
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community standards are an essential part of a philosophy of scientific knowledge-generation: 
they are part of the context of justification. 
To see this, recall our Bayesian sketches of independence and sharpness. Read narrowly, 
Bayesian evidence just are observations which grant reason to update our subjective priors 
pertaining to relevant hypotheses. Powerful formalisms are bought to the fore to demonstrate 
how various aspects of evidence can be incorporated into this probabilistic picture. And indeed 
this is often an enlightening and rich way of proceeding29.  
Although bayesian machinery can precisify what we mean by independence and sharpness, 
it doesn’t follow from this that the machinery captures what matters about sharpness or 
independence. First, it does not tell us under what epistemic circumstances sharpness or 
independence ought to be favoured. That is, although the Bayesian can combine the two 
measures, and accommodate them, she cannot link them to evidential context. To do this, we 
would need to represent either something like our epistemic landscape or, in a less abstract 
mood, characterize the actual conditions scientists are working under, and the actual aims they 
have. A Bayesian precisification might explain why, for instance, variety of evidence reasoning 
can be epistemically powerful, but it cannot explain why scientists might need to ‘do things 
differently’ in different contexts. That is, it cannot explain why one group of scientists adopting 
an obligate strategy is the right thing to do, while another group adopting an omnivore strategy 
is the right thing to do. Epistemic situations, then, are a crucial part of the context of 
justification.  
Second, such a precisification cannot explain community standards—method biases—that 
shape how a scientific community behaves. That is, in addition to missing epistemic context, 
they also cannot accommodation epistemic situations. And our modelling demonstrates how 
important such biases might be for the epistemic success of those communities: by maintaining 
                                                             
29 Wallach (2016) for instance, has no problem fitting diverse archaeological evidence into a Bayesian 
framework. 
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a diversity of strategies, for example, or for targeting particular evidential properties. 
Understanding scientific evidence involves understanding how a community’s conception of 
good method shapes what work in fact gets done.  
As with other objections to narrow conceptions, we do not claim that such work is without 
value, nor that it fails to achieve many of its aims. Rather, the point is that the perspective is 
itself limited—and even limited in terms of its narrow concerns of evidence and confirmation—
as such, we take consideration of method pluralism to further a more pluralistic, increasingly 
local, approach to science from philosophers themselves. 
7. Conclusion 
Our aim in this paper has been to first, introduce the notion of method bias as it arises from 
a recognition of method-pluralism; second, to explore these notions using a series of 
simulations; third, to sketch some consequences for philosophical understanding for scientific 
knowledge. The extent to which lessons from this second aim can be exported into actual 
practice depends crucially on the extent to which the model’s simplifying assumptions matter 
for features of the real-world systems—scientific communities—that we’re interested in. 
Models like ours must be contextualized to have direct empirical consequences. Regardless, the 
experiments motivate a series of further, potentially testable, claims about scientific 
communities. Insofar as the epistemic landscape will favour certain kinds of studies, publishing 
bias can effect this by increasing efficiency, diversity, or both. Moreover, it is plausible that 
positive discrimination works better than negative discrimination—make it easier for the little 
guy, not harder for the big guy. The trade-offs faced are not simple; sometimes at least the 
introduction of method bias of the sort discussed here will have greater gains than losses. Such 
considerations, we think, motivate a richer, more local understanding of the nature of scientific 
evidence and confirmation. 
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